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Abstract 
The twin thrusts of neoliberal paternalism have in recent decades become fused elements of diverse 
reform agendas across the advanced economies yet neoliberalism and paternalism present radically 
divergent and even contradictory views of the subject across four key spaces of ontology, teleology, 
deontology and ascetics. These internal fractures in the conceptual and resulting policy framework 
of neoliberal paternalism present considerable risks around unintended policy mismatch across 
these four spaces or, alternatively, offer significant flexibility for deliberate mismatch and ‘storying’ 
by policymakers. This article traces these tensions in the context of the UK Coalition government’s 
approach to the unemployed and outlines a current policy approach to employment activation that 
is filled with ambiguity, inconsistency and contradiction in its understanding of the subject, the 
‘problem’, and the policy ‘solution’.  
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Introduction 
From at least the 1980s onwards the post-war welfare state has been the object of sustained 
critique from across the political spectrum as it was accused variously of being bloated, inefficient, 
ineffective and stifling of citizen choice (Rose, 1996:330). Although diverse in their origins and focus, 
these critiques arise from what Dean (2002) describes as a mismatch between a still Beveridgian-
oriented supply-led post-war liberal government with the changing nature of subjects and their 
expectations of and from government. The post-war neoliberalism of the Mont Pelerin Society was 
followed by stagflation, oil shocks and large scale strike actions through the 1970s that shook the 
Keynesian hegemony. The inter-related rise of ‘small state’ politics and economic thinking from key 
players such as Thatcher, Reagan and Friedman reflected not just the emergence of the monetarist 
economic framework but broader shifts around ideas of choice, markets and responsibility within a 
civil society calling increasingly for individuals to be more ‘active’ in their own government (Rose, 
1996:330). In response, Dean (2002) describes a process of enfolding through which these emergent 
values and expectations of civil society are brought into the political and policy spheres across two 
distinct axes – paternalism and neoliberalism – that today combine across many fields of social 
policy including housing, education, parenting and, the focus of this article, employment activation.  
On the paternalistic side, the work of US scholar Lawrence Mead has been particularly 
influential in crystallising, justifying and politicising calls for the well-intentioned state to be 
prepared to enforce ‘common obligations of citizenship’ for the good of those citizens who, often 
despite their best intentions, either cannot or will not deliver those obligations of shared citizenship 
(Mead, 1986; 1997). The primary concern for Mead is for the state to ensure that the obligation 
towards paid work – the duty which for Mead trumps all others – is enforced wherever citizens are 
failing to execute it themselves in order that individuals can become fully accepted as equal citizens 
within the community. 
Mead’s paternalism is however not the only possible or necessary response to this perceived 
mismatch between civil society and government policy and neoliberalism has throughout the latter 
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half of the twentieth century taken up this terrain aggressively and effectively. Neoliberalism is of 
course less a coherent theoretical and policy programme than a heterogeneous banner of related, 
but diverse and shifting, ideas (Harvey, 2005; Stedman Jones, 2012). For the post-war neoliberal 
thinkers of the Mont Pelerin Society – Hayek, von Mises and Popper most notably – the spectre of 
National Socialism, the rise of the Iron Curtain and, perhaps most concerning for the group, signs of  
creeping social democracy across Britain and the USA meant that protecting freedom from the 
perceived tyrannies of statist collectivism was the central concern. Free markets and small states 
were key to achieving this freedom (particularly for von Mises and Hayek) but freedom for the 
individual in a political sense was the priority. By the late twentieth, however, Friedman in particular 
had in one sense narrowed neoliberalism’s gaze towards a more technical focus on positivist 
economics and free markets as ends in themselves. Yet neoliberals also increasingly began to 
recognize the possibilities from, and arguably the need for, expanding neoliberalism’s reach towards 
an infiltratory and qualitatively transformative relationship to the state as a key ‘positive’ sphere 
with which to grow, protect and enhance the operation of free markets, not merely as a ‘negative’ 
space to shrink in order to allow markets to expand (Friedman, 1951). 
Neoliberalism has by now woven its key tenets (choice, freedom, responsibility, 
individualisation) and mechanisms (quasi-markets, outsourced provision, payment-by-results) 
through the very fabric of modern welfare states across the world. This ‘governmentalization of 
government’ (Dean, 2002) – the reflexive and strategic enfolding of governmental ends into its very 
practices – can be understood both as an inevitable step in liberal government’s perennial fear of 
governing too much and as an alternative instrument to discipline subject’s behaviours alongside 
direct paternalistic interventions (Dean, 2002:50). As Soss et al (2011:3) describe, the 
neoliberalisation of welfare systems reflects the  expansion and intensification of the market logic 
“as an organizing principle for all social relations” (Soss et al. 2009:2) as well as to “the state as an 
instrument for constructing market opportunities, absorbing market costs, and imposing market 
discipline” (Soss et al. 2011: 3 ). In doing so, and quite unlike the view of markets as ‘natural’ spheres 
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in classical liberal economics, neoliberal arrangements of welfare systems recognise the artificiality 
and fragility of markets and the need to constantly create, advance and protect market mechanisms 
and ideologies. As such, neoliberalism leads to more rather than less state involvement and 
intervention – a roll-up and roll-out of the state rather than any roll-back (Schram et al. 2010; Brown 
2003). 
Taken together, the recent literature on neoliberal paternalism presents a theoretically, 
historically and empirically rich analysis of how these two sets of logics and practices have been 
intertwined in US social security reform around the governance of unemployed individuals (Soss et 
al., 2009; 2011). Although largely neglected to date beyond this focus, the conceptual lens of 
neoliberal paternalism offers considerable potential to better understand these linked 
reconfigurations of welfare systems across diverse policy fields.  
Despite its conceptual and empirical potential, however, as well as its policy prominence, 
neoliberal paternalism offers internally diverse and contradictory views of the subject and this 
presents policy makers with risks, or possibly with flexible opportunities, for mismatch across four 
key analytical spaces (Dean, 1994): 
 Ontology: the understanding of what is being governed in terms of the nature of the subject 
conceived; 
 Ascetics: the understanding of how subjects are being governed; 
 Deontology: the understanding of the mode of subjectivation in terms of why subjects relate 
themselves to the moral code; 
 Teleology: the understanding of the end goal in terms of the vision of the subject that is 
hoped to be produced. 
 
The remainder of the paper explores divergences, tensions and contradictions in the understanding 
of the unemployed subject over these four analytical spaces both within the conceptual framework 
of neoliberal paternalism and in the particular policy operationalisation of that framework within the 
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UK Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government’s transformed approach to employment 
activation between 2010 and 2015. 
 
Neoliberal paternalism and paradoxical subjects: ontological fractures and ambiguities 
 
A natural starting point for the discussion is to focus on the ontological accounts of who the 
subject is understood to be within the two sides of the neoliberal paternalistic framework – the raw 
material that Coalition employment activation policies feel that they are working with. Within the 
neoliberal lens the subject is seen as fundamentally ‘rational’ and hence in principle able to 
effectively navigate the framework of social, economic and policy choices and requirements laid 
before them. The ‘problem’ in the eyes of policy makers is that some rational subjects make ‘wrong’, 
or possibly just ‘sub-optimal’, choices in terms of their own well-being – smoking, inadequate 
retirement saving or, in the field of activation, inadequate or misguided efforts to move into paid 
work. Given that subjects are perceived to be rational, however, there is though no core problem 
with the basic operation of the subject’s agency. Instead, the aim of libertarian (or so-called ‘soft’) 
paternalists is to use policy to restructure incentives and choices so as to enhance individual’s 
freedom of choice indirectly such that they are encouraged to make ‘better’ choices themselves and 
without any direct constraints around those choices. Flowing in particular from the nudge economics 
of Thaler and Sunstein (2009), operationalised most clearly in the UK in the form of the government 
aligned Behavioural Insights Team, this libertarian paternalism of behaviour guidance and 
incentivisation has become a prominent policy trend in recent years to seek to improve the self-
selected outcomes of subjects who are assumed to be rational (Jones et al., 2013).  
In contrast, the hard paternalism of writers such as Mead imagine subjects in receipt of 
social security not as fundamentally rational yet in need of steering but, instead, as either unable or 
unwilling to operate effectively within the required framework of choices and responsibilities. On 
the one hand, some individuals are cast as cognitively unable to exercise rational choice effectively. 
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For these subjects hard paternalists suggest that the state must step into the role of benevolent 
guardian by making ‘good choices’ directly on their behalf.  In contrast, other subjects – such as 
those in receipt of social security – are perceived as able in principle to operate rationally within the 
range of choices and responsibilities laid before them but as unwilling in practice to exercise their 
choices or to fulfil their obligations appropriately – more of a perceived withdrawal from the ‘choice 
architecture’ than a misdirection within it as for the soft paternalists. In response, hard paternalists 
advocate a need to energise such individuals for their own benefit through the offering of support, 
motivation and, if necessary, mandation and benefit sanctions so as to catapult them into action and 
to keep them ‘active’ (Mead, 1993).  
The view of the subject is therefore fundamentally different across the two sides of the 
neoliberal paternalistic coin: the essentially rational (if ‘sub-optimal’) subject of neoliberalism versus 
the either irrational or unwilling subject of the hard paternalist. More subtly, Dean (2002: 48) offers 
a typology of qualitatively distinct types of unemployed liberal subject: those who have attained 
capacities for autonomy and are effective self-regulators of their conduct; those who need 
assistance to maintain capacities for autonomous self-regulation; those who are potentially able to 
self-regulate autonomously but who need training in the habits and capacities to do so; and those 
who are incapable of autonomous self-regulation or of acting in their own best interest. These may 
be different individuals or may indeed be the same individuals at different points in time (Hoggett, 
2001). The framework of neoliberal paternalism, however, masks this variability and instead 
presents a muddied homogenisation filled with inconsistency and uncertainty in terms of the nature 
of the subject that is envisages.  
This presents policy makers with risks of unintended policy misspecification or, alternatively, 
with flexibility and hence opportunity within which to deliberately ‘story’ a desired ontological 
narrative and policy response. These risks and opportunities are certainly apparent in the UK 
government’s approach to activation policy under Conservative Party leadership since 2010. A 
central ontological thread across Conservative Party ministerial speeches since 2010 has been 
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persistent accusations that the modern social security system has inadvertently created a ‘welfare 
society’ (Cameron, 2011) in which the culture of collective duty has been eroded and been replaced 
by a ‘something for nothing culture’ (Duncan Smith, 2011a) where the unemployed ‘choose a life on 
benefits’ (Cameron, 2012a). The alleged consequence has been the emergence of a ‘deeply-
ingrained benefit culture’ (Grayling, 2011a) in which the unemployed lack the ‘work habit’ (Duncan 
Smith, 2011a; 2012a) and in which ‘idleness is institutionalised’ (Duncan Smith, 2010a) ‘across 
generations and throughout communities’ (Duncan Smith, 2010b). 
Conservative Party discourse frequently veers further into more extreme apocalyptical and 
medicalised discourses of the unemployed as a social ‘other’ that is ‘disconnected’ (Duncan Smith, 
2012a), ‘adrift’ (Duncan Smith, 2011b) and ‘detached from the rest of us’ (Duncan Smith, 2010b, 
author’s italics). The alleged creation of ‘a growing underclass…shut away, dysfunctional and too 
often violent’ (Duncan Smith, 2011a) is depicted as the result of an almost medicalised individual 
moral condition that threatens contagion to the health of the wider society: the unemployed are 
cast as a ‘residual group’ (Duncan Smith, 2010c) who need ‘recovery’ (Duncan Smith, 2012b) and 
‘cure’ (Duncan Smith, 2012c) from their depicted illness of benefit dependency and for whom 
‘containment is not an option anymore’ (Duncan Smith, 2011a).  
As many have pointed out previously these narratives rest on weak empirical foundations 
(Wright, 2011; Wiggan, 2012; Slater, 2014; Macdonald et al., 2014), even according to the 
government’s own evidence (DWP, 2010; 2011a; 2011b). This is by now well known. Leaving aside 
the empirical shakiness of many of the Coalition’s ontological claims, however, more interesting for 
the present argument is how these cultural and behavioural discourses simultaneously sit alongside 
a depiction of the unemployed instead as rational actors and of unemployment as driven by rational 
responses to perverse incentives within the benefits system. In this argument, government ministers 
argue instead that most of the unemployed ‘want to work’ (Grayling, 2010) and are ‘desperate to get 
a job’ (Duncan Smith, 2014b). On this reading, the problem ministers suggest is an overly complex 
social security system in which complicated and interacting rules and marginal withdrawal rates 
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make it financially unattractive, uncertain or risky for rational subjects to leave benefits and enter 
paid work (Grayling, 2011b; Duncan Smith, 2012d; Duncan Smith, 2014b). Hence, whilst being 
‘tough’ via sanctions and conditionality is discussed as the antidote for a culturally feckless 
unemployed population Coalition ministers also emphasise the need to be ‘smart’ through the 
redesign of the benefits system into a new, holistic Universal Credit benefit to enhance and clarify 
financial incentives to work and to minimise risks around work transitions, even if Coalition changes 
to Universal Credit (e.g. reductions in the work allowance) and other benefits effectively chip away 
at these stated financial returns to work for many. 
Irrespective of their empirical veracity or otherwise, Coalition discourse therefore presents 
two fundamentally contradictory visions of who the unemployed subject is: the hard paternalistic 
account of ‘shirkers’ and ‘skivers’ needing ‘tough love’ interventions of ever-stronger conditionality 
and sanctions to push them into ‘responsibility’ as well as the neoliberal vision of the rational 
unemployed needing adjustment of the choice architectures to better align desired ‘positive’ 
outcomes with rational (even if imperfect) decision-making processes. At the same time, although 
both ontological accounts of the nature of the unemployed subject run simultaneously within 
government framing it is noteworthy that it is the hard paternalistic discourse of ‘shirking’ and 
‘skiving’ that is by far the more vocal and public of the two, a discourse that both feeds and flows 
from the consistent hardening in public attitudes towards social security recipients that the UK has 
witnessed unabated since the turn of the century.  
These divergent visions align with the two sides of the conceptual framework of neoliberal 
paternalism and are enabled, even encouraged, by the fractures within it. In terms of their 
implications for policy, these ontological fractures within Coalition discourse of the unemployed flow 
through to, and interact via feedback loops with, the ‘downstream’ spaces of deontology, teleology 
and ascetics and these four analytical spaces must be considered together in order to offer a holistic 
assessment of whether the policy package provides a coherent, subtle and appropriate response to 
the subjects that it interacts with. To do so, the next section therefore connects this ontological 
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discussion of the subject-as-is through to the teleological vision of the desired subject-to-be before 
moving on in the following section to link these two visions via the nature of the policies relied upon 
to deliver that transformation. 
 
Who do you want me to be?: Unpacking neoliberal paternalism’s desired subject 
 
As Wright (2012) notes, although social security reforms across the advanced economies in 
recent decades have at their core a vision of creating ‘active’ subjects from social security recipients 
presently constructed by government as ‘inactive’, there is uncertainty and ambiguity around the 
precise nature of this desired ‘active’ subject. It is well-known that the empirical veracity of 
government’s claims of ‘passivity’ amongst the unemployed is highly problematic (Wiggan, 2012; 
Slater, 2012; Wright, 2012; 2015). Of particular interest to the present argument however is the 
recognition that two quite distinct visions of the desired ‘active’ subject have tended to dominate 
within the employment activation literature – those of ‘docile subjects’ and ‘entrepreneurial selves’ 
– and these alternatives can fruitfully be discussed in relation to evolutions in the thinking of Michel 
Foucault. 
The idea of the ‘docile subject’ has received much discussion within the critical social policy 
literature around modern activation polices. If active labour market programmes are potential 
vehicles for the improvement, even transformation, of individual life courses then they are at the 
same time also systemic instruments to police employment activity (of both workers and the 
unemployed) and to furnish markets with an increased reserve army of available labour with which 
to discipline current workers, depress real wages and control the non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment. As Peck (2001:6) argues, from this perspective “[S]tripped down to its labor-
regulatory essence, workfare is not about creating jobs for people that don’t have them; it’s about 
creating workers for jobs that nobody wants”.  Hence, the telos of activation policies on this reading 
– by which is meant the vision of the subject that is hoped to be produced – is a subject who 
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accepts, or at least quietly tolerates, the imperative within the moral code to participate in the 
labour market in whatever form it is presented to them and in whatever role they are mandated to 
perform. In terms of its deontology, therefore, the relationship of subjects to that moral code is 
provided according to a hard paternalistic logic of externally imposed conditionality and sanctions, 
irrespective of any mismatches with subjects’ own stated choices and aspirations or of any negative 
implications for their well-being. 
Foucault’s discussion of ‘docile subjects’ reflects his earlier understanding of power more as 
a dichotomous and repressive domination in a zero-sum conflict between agents, but in later works 
this understanding of power is developed into a more creative, contested and dynamic concept 
(Lemke, 2012: 19-20). This later understanding of power has provided analytically rich terrain for 
critical analysis and that underpins an alternative vision of the subject as an ‘entrepreneurial self’. In 
keeping with the general trend towards the individualisation of risk and responsibility within social 
policy in recent years, this entrepreneurial subject is required to be the fully individualised bearer of 
risk optimisation in their life course, to scan the horizon for present and future risks and 
opportunities and to dynamically and proactively manage the creative optimisation of those risks 
and opportunities so that benefits to the self and broader society are maximised whilst potential 
disbenefits are minimised. Proactive ‘agility’ rather than passive ‘docility’ therefore becomes a key 
characteristic of the ‘entrepreneurial self’ (Gillies, 2011). In terms of its deontology, the aim is not 
just that entrepreneurial subjects will comply with this vision but more deeply that they will accept 
and internalise this vision as legitimate and so ‘voluntarily’ bind themselves to its moral code of 
individualised risk optimisation. Central to realising this vision therefore are policies of psychological 
governance that seek to affect subject’s behaviours and subjectivities (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009; 
Jones et al., 2013). The view is of a neoliberal logic of ‘natural’, clearing markets in which subjects 
navigate ‘freely’ through the choice architecture in governmentally desired ways but without the 
‘unnatural’ coercive impositions of the hard paternalist that can be seen as conceptually antithetical 
to the vision of the entrepreneurial subject.  
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There is moreover a dichotomy buried within this idea of the entrepreneurial subject 
between what might be described as negatively and positive entrepreneurial selves.  For the 
negatively entrepreneurial subject the emphasis is on the individualised bearing of risk and 
responsibility for any ‘failure’ to transform one’s circumstances but without the supports, resources 
or opportunities to be likely to realise that transformation (Crespo Suarez and Serrano Pascual, 
2007). The result is a subject whose energies and incentives are focused defensively on managing 
risk so as to avoid harm and get by as best as possible within the activation regime and labour 
market rather than being focussed progressively on moving forwards or optimising within it. In 
contrast, although the positively entrepreneurial subject also has to defensively manage risks to 
avoid harm they enjoy sufficient supports, resources and opportunities to be able to viably carve out 
meaningful positive steps in the remaking of themselves and their life course within the labour 
market.  
Sitting within this context, the Coalition’s vision of the desired unemployed subject-to-be 
can perhaps best be understood as a Russian doll of nested layers whose grand and transformative 
vision gradually shrinks and narrows as one searches for its more tangible inner substance and 
specificity. At the highest level the Coalition talk of their ambitions to use social security reform to 
effect ‘life change’ (Duncan Smith, 2011b; 2014a) and to make a ‘transformational difference’ 
(Grayling, 2011b) to the lives of unemployed individuals, supporting them to ‘take control’ (Freud 
2014; Duncan Smith, 2014b) of their lives and to ‘realise their potential’ (Duncan Smith, 2014b; 
Grayling, 2012a).  
The substantive content of these ideas remains unclear however. Instead, the narrower 
concept of ‘independence’ recurs as the core and firmer idea within the vision, with ministers talking 
repeatedly of the central aim being to ‘break the chains of dependency’ (Duncan Smith, 2014b) and 
to support the unemployed on a ‘journey back from dependence to independence’ (Duncan Smith, 
2012a; 2012c; 2012d). Although introducing notions of agency and freedom, the Coalition’s notion 
of ‘independence’ is specific and restrictive however in terms of both the activities and cultures that 
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it contains and promotes. The core of the Coalition’s understanding of ‘independence’ is to be off 
out-of-work benefits and in paid work of some form, with ministers elevating those striving to get 
into and move on through low paid work, celebrating their vision of a ‘model, dependable and hard 
working employee’ (Grayling, 2012b) that has a self-reliant income source.  Ministers assert the need 
to transform the aspiration of the unemployed, aspiration which it is claimed ‘is in danger of 
becoming the preserve of the wealthy’ (Duncan Smith, 2010a). The result is a starkly simple and 
individualised policy prescription that David Cameron summarises as follows: “there’s too much 
‘can’t do’ sogginess around. We need to be a sharp, focused, can-do country…Let’s show the world 
some fight” (Cameron, 2012b).  
Within these ideas emerges an idea of the self-made entrepreneur who through their own 
sheer hard-work transforms their life course and rises up through the labour market. Ministers 
subscribe to an idea of the positively entrepreneurial unemployed subject – autonomously 
responsibilised for their own future, individualised bearers and optimisers of their own risks and 
opportunities, but also confident believers that unemployed subjects can move up through the 
labour market and achieve uncapped success and wealth for themselves through hard work and 
application. Questions can of course be asked about whether this vision is realistically achievable for 
the majority of the (particularly long-term) UK unemployed and whether, as a consequence, the 
vision in practice regresses back to one of docility or negative entrepreneurialism.  
Whilst David Cameron urges subjects to “bring on the can-do optimism” (Cameron, 2011) in 
order to drive economic growth and overcome unemployment, Coalition positivity downplays 
considerably the significant structural economic and policy challenges that the UK unemployed face 
in seeking to move into paid work. Supporting the unemployed – and particularly the long-term 
unemployed – into paid work requires intensive, tailored, high quality support that is often absent 
from a UK activation context that spends only around a quarter of comparable European economies 
on such programmes (Eurostat, 2014). The Coalition’s flagship Work Programme, discussed in detail 
in the next section, is failing to alter these trends (Newton et al., 2012; WPSC, 2013; Meager et al., 
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2013) and is set to be refocused and shrunk in size in its future guise as Work and Health Programme 
from 2017. More deeply, the Coalition’s vision follows a long-standing bias towards the elevation of 
paid work in the construction of ‘independence’ (Fraser and Gordon, 1994), artificially relegating 
productive activities such as unpaid care or volunteering despite these being central to individual’s 
subjectivities and behaviours (Lister, 2003; Williams, 2004). Yet even within the Coalition’s own 
construction of ‘independence’ as paid work it is striking how absent are considerations of the 
context within which the unemployed operate:  the poor quality, low pay, insecurity or weak 
progression opportunities of employment are left virtually undiscussed within Coalition speeches yet 
are central issues within the low-paid sector of the UK economy into which most jobseekers operate 
(Shildrick et al., 2012). Instead, the message is that any job will do and that any job constitutes a ‘life 
transformation’ compared to unemployment. This is despite the well-known reality that one third of 
entries to employment do not result in exits from poverty (Wright, 2011), around half of poor 
working age adults are in employment, just under half of the working poor work 40+ hours per week 
(Bailey, 2014) and that around 2.25 million low-paid working families continue to receive financial 
support from the government in the form of Working Tax Credit.  
What remains seems a mismatch between an ‘in principle’ transformative vision of positive 
entrepreneurialism contrasted with a contextually and empirically informed ‘in practice’ vision of 
negative entrepreneurialism or docility in which the unemployed and low-paid must be mandated to 
individually bear the risks, responsibilities and consequences of their place in the labour market and 
their (often unsuccessful) attempts to progress within it (Wright, 2015). 
 
The ascetics of activation: processes and practices in supporting the unemployed 
 
Linking together these different visions – that of the subject-as-is and that of the desired 
subject-to-be – lies the ascetic nature of policy on the ground that unemployed subjects experience. 
Whilst the logic of the neoliberal ontology is the desire to steer, inform and enhance the freedom 
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and self-made choices of rational subjects towards ends considered superior, the defining policy 
instrument of the hard paternalist is that of sanction-backed mandation which whether by its use, its 
threat or its mere presence is instead used to coerce the unemployed towards the will of the self-
declared benevolent paternalist. In terms of this paper’s focus, the combination of the UK’s wholly 
outsourced and now wholly payment-by-results Work Programme activation scheme alongside the 
UK’s toughest ever post-war regime of sanctions (Slater, 2014) makes the Coalition’s activation 
regime an intriguing ascetic case study to unpick the realities of neoliberal paternalism in action. 
The Work Programme is the UK Coalition government’s flagship activation scheme for the 
long-term unemployed who, depending on their circumstances, are either mandated to or can 
voluntarily enter the programme after an initial period of up to twelve months of public sector 
employment support without moving into paid work. Having started in 2011, the scheme is made up 
of mainly private sector prime providers who have a maximum of two years over which to work with 
claimants either directly and/or via sub-contracted organisations. The programme operates a ‘black 
box’ delivery model with providers having virtually complete flexibility over intervention design in 
order to “unleash the creativity of the industry” (Grayling, 2010). At the heart of the scheme is a 
payment-by-results model with providers’ income streams now dictated entirely by their ability to 
deliver sustained job outcomes. To seek to incentivise providers to work equally hard with all 
unemployed claimants despite their widely differing support needs, claimants are allocated into one 
of nine payment groups based on their prior benefit receipt (as a crude proxy for likelihood of 
moving into paid work) and outcome payment levels vary across those nine groups.  
Yet whilst neoliberalism frames much of Work Programme design, severe and rapidly 
triggered sanctions underpin the scheme: Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants face losing 100% loss of 
benefits for 4 weeks for a ‘first offence’ (e.g. missed appointment) and 13 weeks for any subsequent 
‘offence’. For prime providers too there exists a threat of contract termination if their performance 
is deemed inadequate against set performance benchmarks, although the problematic way in which 
performance measures and contracts were originally designed have resulted both in difficulties in 
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enforcing these threats as well as contractual requirements to pay providers incentive payments for 
‘exceptional performance’ that were driven almost entirely by falling referral volumes rather than 
performance per se (NAO, 2014). 
Ministers describe the Work Programme as a ’radical new approach’ (Freud, 2011b) and 
’real revolution’ (Freud, 2011b), yet in reality the programme extends (albeit markedly) a well-
established trajectory towards centrally steered quasi-marketisation under the previous Labour 
governments (Lister and Bennett, 2010). To date the scheme has struggled in a context of a sluggish 
economy, weak labour markets and poorer than expected job outcomes, particularly with claimants 
with more significant barriers to employment. Work Programme providers have as a result been 
operating in extremely challenging environment of intense pressures on costs, income streams and 
on performance. On-going questions remain over the efficacy of the differential pricing mechanism 
between the nine payment groups to drive performance and mitigate risks of ‘creaming’ and 
‘parking’ – the deliberate cherry-picking of ‘easier’ claimants (‘creaming’) and deliberate neglect of 
‘harder to help’ claimants (‘parking’) – given that these groups hide enormous variability within 
them in terms of the varying types and levels of employment support that claimants need (Carter 
and Whitworth, 2014). Concerns also remain more fundamentally around whether the financial 
resources within the Work Programme payments system are adequate to support those claimants 
requiring more intensive and more expensive employment support (WPSC, 2013).  
Set within this challenging context both provision and performance have been somewhat 
disappointing. Providers have tended to retreat back to a core of relatively basic, standardised and 
low-cost services (e.g. CV writing, interview skills, basic skills training) contrary to the rhetorical 
promises of innovation, personalisation and intensity from government and providers. Advisors state 
that they have not always felt able to offer adequate supports to overcome claimants’ barriers to 
work, with minimal use made so far of referrals to more intensive, but paid-for, specialist providers 
(Newton et al., 2012; Lane et al., 2013; Meager et al., 2013).There is some evidence of lesser contact 
and support being offered to ‘harder-to-help’ claimants driven in part by a systemic downward spiral 
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of under-funding for such claimants as result of the miscalibration of the payments design (NAO, 
2014). Related, there is widespread evidence suggestive of deliberate ‘parking’ of such claimants by 
providers (Newton et al., 2012; Meager et al., 2013; Rees et al., 2013). Almost inevitably in this 
context, job outcomes performance has been relatively disappointing, particularly for those ‘harder-
to-help’ claimants. Ongoing concerns over the resourcing, provision and performance of the scheme 
raise serious questions about its transformative potential, concerns that look set to intensify from 
2017 in the new Work and Health Programme from 2017 given its combination of Work Programme 
design template, reduced resources and exclusive focus on the ‘harder-to-help’. 
Of particular relevance to this paper’s focus on neoliberal paternalism and the nature of the 
subject , however, is the balance within the scheme between a hard paternalistic inspired approach 
of top-down claimant allocation and direction as compared to a neoliberal inspired approach of 
enabling and encouraging the use and development of rational claimant’s own choice and agency. 
What is striking about Work Programme in this regard is the paradox between its macro-level and 
micro-level designs.  
At the macro-level the Work Programme is infused with neoliberal characteristics across its 
programme which, despite their problems and limitations in practice, are in many respects 
innovative attempts to drive up innovation, performance, cost efficiency and value-for-money: 
contracts were tendered and bids were sought widely; a multitude of non-state organisations were 
awarded contracts and within large geographical areas (Contract Package Areas) either two or three 
prime providers have claimants randomly allocated to them such that their performance can be 
pitted against each other; Work Programme operates a ‘market share shift’ arrangement whereby 
claimant allocation is gradually weighted towards better performing prime providers; and primes are 
now paid wholly by outcomes and are given almost complete flexibility over the type of provision 
they deliver. 
Yet these macro-level neoliberal sentiments contrast strikingly with claimants’ experiences 
at the micro-level in terms of their severely restricted ability to exercise agency within the scheme in 
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terms of their ability to use what Hirschman (1970) refers to as either ‘voice’ (mechanisms for 
feedback, complaints or design input to shape services) or ‘exit’ (leaving either the provider or a 
particular intervention delivered by their provider) to improve the quality of suitability of their 
employment support. The Work Programme process begins by claimants being randomly allocated 
by the public sector employment service to one of two or three competing Work Programme prime 
providers in their region. Claimants (or, indeed, public sector advisors) have no input to this 
allocation, nor are they able to exit and switch between prime providers once allocated if they feel 
they would receive better support elsewhere (if, for example, they were unhappy with their support 
or if they felt a different provider offered more suitable provision to their particular needs). Once 
with their allocated prime provider opportunities for claimants to exercise agency remain limited. 
Prime providers typically begin by profiling claimants to identify support needs, build an ‘action plan’ 
and identify suitable interventions and supports. Due to intensive cost-pressures, however, advisors 
are able to offer only highly constrained packages of interventions in terms of their range, intensity 
and specificity. More fundamentally, however, action plans are completed overwhelmingly by 
advisors without discussion with claimants and claimants are very rarely aware of the contents of 
their action plan, never mind given a copy to take home. Indeed, action plans are often computer 
generated so that advisers are unable even to have the potential for full flexibility and 
personalisation in action planning. This lack of co-production hinders claimants’ abilities to exercise 
agency to shape or improve the levels and type of employment support that they receive and 
creates clear risks that support needs may not be effectively identified and met (Newton et al., 2012: 
60; Meager et al., 2013). Following this triaging process, prime providers may decide to refer their 
allocated claimants down to an organisation within (or indeed beyond) their own supply chain rather 
than offering support themselves. Such referral is again driven by providers rather than by claimants 
and with claimants again unable to then switch or exit from that referred provider. This is of 
particular concern given evidence that prime providers seem to be referring their allocated 
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claimants to organisations on the basis of cost rather than suitability to claimants’ needs (Newton et 
al., 2012).  
Without rights or processes to choose providers, switch providers, request particular 
supports, or guarantee adequate supports, the overriding sense from the programme evaluation is 
that a significant portion of Work Programme participants are trapped within an activation scheme 
that is not offering the supports needed to move into employment but without the ability to 
exercise agency to achieve meaningful change and existing under constant threat of severe 
sanctions to comply. Although David Freud, Minister for Welfare Reform, argues that the previous 
system ‘infantilises people’ (Freud, 2011a), the experiences of Work Programme participants get no 
closer to Coalition discursive visions of rationality, empowerment, agency or responsibility in terms 
of how they envision the subject-as-is and the subject-to-be. Most obviously, the hard paternalistic 
line ignores the empirical reality that the vast majority of the UK’s unemployed social security 
recipients do not align to this vision of the subject but are instead active and willing – if frustrated 
and constrained – jobseekers (DWP 2011b; Newton et al., 2012:90; Wright, 2015).  
The relative overemphasis within the Work Programme on mandation and sanctions 
combined with the relative neglect of self-directed choice and agency presents considerable 
mismatches both with the nature of the unemployed subjects that the Coalition say that they are 
working with and with those that they are actually working with. Misaligned to both its ontological 
foundations and its teleological aspirations, it is far from clear whether Work Programme can be 
considered a sensible, logically coherent and effective programme. 
 
Discussion 
 
The twin thrusts of neoliberal paternalism have in recent decades become central elements 
of policy reform agendas across diverse policy arenas and welfare systems and the conceptual 
framework of neoliberal paternalism offers considerable potential for our understanding of these 
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shifts in terms of governance practices, subjectivation, and systemic outcomes such as poverty, 
inequality and power. The nature of the subject is however uncertain, heterogeneous and even 
contradictory across the two sides of this conceptual and accompanying policy framework. 
Conceptually, the awkward existence of this paradoxical subject implicit within the lens of neoliberal 
paternalism appears at first to weaken its claims to capture coherently these twin thrusts of policy 
activity in recent decades. Yet it is perhaps a more accurate conclusion to state that the conceptual 
framework merely reproduces the internal fractures and contradictions that exist within neoliberal 
paternalistic policies themselves. This flexibility and fracture presents policy makers both with risks 
of unintended mismatch as well as opportunities for deliberate mismatch and ‘storying’ across the 
four key analytical spaces of ontology, deontology, ascetics and teleology, with considerable 
implications both for programme appropriateness and effectiveness as well as for broader ethical 
concerns around social justice and social inclusion. Making these paradoxes of the subject explicit is 
an important first task in recognising their implications both for policy design and for welfare users.  
The present article is an attempt to stimulate thinking and debate on these issues, taking the 
single case study of UK activation policies as its focus. The discussion highlights ambiguities, 
inconsistencies and contradictions of Coalition activation policy both within and across the four key 
analytical spaces and highlight a need for greater clarity, subtlety and precision – both logical and 
evidential – in our understanding of subjects in receipt of social security benefits within analysis and 
policy making. It identifies vagueness and contradiction within particular analytical spaces 
(unemployed subjects understood as both rational and feckless, Work Programme built on implied 
benefits of both choice and non-choice, and desired subjects as positively entrepreneurial in words 
but more docile or negatively entrepreneurial in deeds) as well across analytical spaces (responsibly 
self-governing subjects desired but no co-produced processes to engage or develop the agency of 
the unemployed for example). 
Such heightened understanding of the subject is required not only to enable policy 
interventions  to be appropriate and effective in supporting differently oriented subjects in a flexible, 
20 
 
contextually specific way but also to ensure that activation supports social justice and social 
inclusion by working with and for – rather, as is currently the case, simply at – unemployed 
claimants. In this regard, bluntest of all within the UK’s current activation regime is the undue 
dominance of hard paternalism in the form of an over-emphasis on mandatory policy demands 
coupled with rapidly triggered and punitive sanctions.  This hard paternalistic view of the 
incompetent and/or unwilling subject is out of line with evidence about the actual nature of 
unemployed subjects. At least as interesting for the present article’s focus, this dominance of hard 
paternalism appears equally incoherent if one ignores evidence and remains solely within the logic 
of the Coalition’s visions in terms of both the subject-as-is as well as the desired subject-to-be. The 
latter telos is a view of an ‘active’, ‘responsible’, ‘entrepreneurial’ subject that sits uneasily alongside 
an ascetic policy framework that relegates the choice and agency that a neoliberal perspective 
would advocate.  
This recognition that unemployed subjects are in contrast rational, motivated, and have 
value instead opens up spaces for claimant agency to flow into the activation regime. Such processes 
for claimant agency are not only opportunities instrumentally for more appropriate and effective 
policies to be designed but also, and arguably more importantly, are key in and of themselves to 
support social justice and social inclusion by severing the link between the (almost always 
temporary) loss of employment with the loss of self that the current activation regime unnecessarily 
and inappropriately enforces – from capable, trustworthy, valuable and rational when employed to 
incapable, untrustworthy, valueless and unable and/or unwilling when unemployed. There is no 
logical, ethical or evidential reason why those temporarily without work should be mandatorily 
disempowered and excluded from their very selves, particularly in the context of an activation 
regimes described by policy makers as seeking to enhance social inclusion and social justice. The task 
of rebuilding of an activation regime that is both more just and more effective must as its first task 
engage critically with fully understanding the nature of the subject that it is seeking to support. 
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